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Abstract 
A standard repurchase agreement between two counterparties is considered to examine 
the endogenous choice of collateral assets, the feasibility of secured lending, and welfare 
implications of the central bank’s collateral framework. As an important innovation, we 
allow for two-sided counterparty risk. Our findings relate to empirical characteristics of 
repo transactions and have an immediate bearing on market developments since August 
2007.  
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Non-technical summary
Why is it the case that illiquid and risky assets are used so little as collateral
in the interbank market? How could it happen that, during the summer
turbulences of 2007, interbank lending secured by certain types of collateral
(such as structured assets) became so much less common in the money mar-
ket? Why do commercial banks have a preference for using relatively illiquid
assets as collateral vis-à-vis the central bank? And what are the welfare
implications of the central bank’s collateral framework?
To explore these and related questions, the present paper takes a closer
look at the role of collateral in the interbank lending relationship. A scenario
is analyzed in which two commercial banks, a borrower and a lender, negoti-
ate simultaneously about (a) the collateral assets to be used, (b) the haircut,
and (c) the repo rate. In contrast to the existing theoretical literature, we
allow for two-sided credit risk, i.e., the possibility that also the lender may
default. The following results are obtained.
First, we demonstrate that it will always be e!cient to share risks be-
tween the two counterparties. That is, typically both counterparties in a repo
transaction will be exposed to non-trivial counterparty risk. This central re-
sult has the implication that if two commercial banks agree to transact, they
always agree to use the most liquid and the least risky assets of the borrower
as collateral rst. Thus, in a bilateral transaction between two commercial
banks that may each default with positive probability, good collateral drives
out bad collateral.
Second, if the most liquid and least risky assets of the borrower are still
relatively illiquid or risky, then the two banks may, under certain conditions,6
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not be able to agree on a transaction at all. This outcome occurs in partic-
ular if default probabilities are non-negligible and collateral assets have the
potential to become illiquid. The break-down of the market under two-sided
credit risk is a potentially important result as it can explain why there is
hardly any interbank repo market in which risky or illiquid asset types are
used as collateral. It also complements existing structural explanations of
the microstructure of the money market based on asymmetric information,
and last but not least allows us to apply an important theoretical argument
that has been put forward recently by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002).
Finally, we study the welfare implications of the central bank’s collateral
policy. It is shown that an expansion of the set of collateral eligible for central
bank operations may indeed lead to a welfare improvement for market partic-
ipants. However, the expansion of the set of eligible collateral will typically
be accompanied by a replacement of liquid collateral by illiquid collateral,
i.e. bad collateral drives out good collateral in lending relationships with the
central bank. Moreover, such replacement is not likely to be stopped by an
adjustment of haircuts.
Our ndings oer a potential rationale for the willingness of major cen-
tral banks to broaden the range of assets accepted as collateral during the
market turmoil. In the specic case of the Eurosystem, with its already very
broad range of eligible collateral, the analysis comes to the conclusion that
a widening of the set of eligible collateral would not necessarily be or have
been supportive for a resolution of the credit crunch in the interbank market.
Indeed, there is no evidence that too much high quality collateral is bound in
operations conducted by the Eurosystem. We also argue that the situation7
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might have been dierent in the US and in the UK, where policy measures
included the expansion of the set of assets accepted by the Federal Reserve
and the Bank of England, respectively.8
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Introduction
Standard (sale and) repurchase agreements, or repos (RPs) in short, are used
by both private and public counterparties to conveniently swap cash against
collateral for a pre-den e dp e r i o do ft i m e . I na n ys u c hc o n t r a c t ,t h ec a s h
lender is usually compensated in the form of a repo rate, which is essentially
an interest on the gross value of the transaction. Moreover, a haircut is
applied to the collateral to limit the exposure for the cash lender in the case
that the borrower is unable to repay the principal amount plus interest, and
at the same time the liquidation value of the collateral declines below the
creditor’s claim.4
The theoretical analysis of repurchase agreements started with the semi-
nal contribution by Du!e (1996) who has pointed out that when owners of
as p e c i c asset incur frictional costs from using the asset as collateral, the
repo rate for the asset may fall signicantly below the repo rate charged for
general collateral. Moreover, through its impact on funding conditions, such
specialness is predicted to add a premium to the asset’s market price. In
a number of recent papers, this theoretical prediction on competitive repo
markets has been empirically conrmed from dierent perspectives.5
4Over the last few years, the repo segment has gained considerable importance in inter-
national money markets. For instance, the euro repo market has been growing on average
by 17% annually since 2002, while the unsecured market segment has been expanding only
moderately over the same period (cf. ECB, 2007a). The growth of repo markets is often
attributed to an anticipated benet under Basle II capital regulation and to an increasing
reliance on the instrument in central banks’ implementation frameworks. There is also an
increasing interest in national repo markets. See for instance papers by Baba and Inamura
(2004), Fan and Zhang (2007), Jordan and Kugler (2004), and Wetherilt (2003).
5Jordan and Jordan (1997) validate specialness in repo rates using daily data for the
US Treasury repo market of overnight general collateral rates and special nancing rates.
Based on a data set for the German money market, Buraschi and Menini (2002) reject the
rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure for the repo market, and nd empir-
ical evidence for a time-varying liquidity risk premium. Krishnamurthy (2002) identies9
ECB
Working Paper Series No 909
June 2008
An assumption underlying this existing theory of the repo market is that
there is an investor (the “Short”) who seeks to get hold of a well-specied
asset through the repo market transaction. However, it has been noted at
various places that in general the repo market is open both to investors in
search of a specic security and to investors in search of cash. That is, there
are also repurchase agreements that are driven mainly by the funding motive,
with the choice of collateral being of secondary importance.6 As a practical
matter, this dierence in the motive for approaching the market is not only
re ected by the side that initiates the trade (i.e., who is calling whom), but
also in dierences in the margining (either in cash or in collateral). Moreover,
in the case of cash-driven repos, the repo rate for less liquid collateral may also
exceed the rate for general collateral.7 The present paper aims at exploring
the determinants of collateral in such cash-driven repurchase agreements. To
this end, we introduce counterparty risk into a partial equilibrium model of
bilaterally negotiated repurchase agreements.
Two empirical regularities have motivated this route of inquiry. One ob-
servation is that typically, only collateral of the highest quality is accepted in
the interbank market. This can be seen by comparing the collateral usage of
the private repo market with uses of collateral in the large-scale repo trans-
repo specialness as a cost-of-carry that renders convergence trading much less protable
than suggested by bond spreads.
6As far as we know, there is so far no empirical evidence on the share of interbank repo
transactions in the euro area that is cash-driven. For instance, in Comotto’s (2007, p. 17)
product analysis, there is no split-up for the bulk of the repo desk activity. However, the
evidence for the US market surveyed by Buraschi and Menini (2002, p. 253) suggests a
role for the funding motive in repo markets even under normal market conditions.
7For instance, Gri!ths and Winters (1997) document an average spread for repos
on collateral issued by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) over
government bonds of 8.5 basis points during the period February 1984 through January
1985.10
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actions conducted by central banks. For instance, as shown in Table I, the Table I
about
here c o l l a t e r a lu s e dd u r i n g2 0 0 6i nt h ep r i v a t ee u r or e p om a r k e th a sb e e nm o s t l y
government bonds. Illiquid and risky assets such as asset-backed securities
(ABS) are not commonly employed as collateral in the private bilateral repo
market. This situation stands in stark contrast with the composition of col-
lateral held with the European Central Bank (ECB) that accepts a wide
range of asset types including government bonds, bank bonds (both uncov-
ered and covered), corporate bonds, ABS, other marketable securities, and
credit claims. During 2006, only about 29 percent of assets deposited for use
as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations were issued by governments.
More generally, Table I shows that vis-à-vis the central bank, highly liquid
and safe assets such as government bonds have played a subordinate role,
while uncovered bank bonds and asset-backed securities have been forwarded
extensively.
The second regularity in the data is related to more recent developments
that have impacted also on interbank credit relationships. Following the
summer 2007 nancial market turbulences, requirements on collateral assets
imposed by cash-lenders in the interbank market became even stricter than
they usually are. Indeed, recent data by Clearstream (2007, p. 15) shows
that the share of structured securities used as collateral in tri-party repos
has fallen from 35 percent to 25 percent between June 1 and September 14,
2007, with ABS Auto, Card, CDOs, and MBS the most aected through the
subprime crisis. This is consistent with observations by Comotto (2008, p.
19) who writes that “Concern over the quality of collateral could explain the
reduction in the share of tri-party repos, which has been the preferred way of11
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managing non-government collateral. It denitely explains [...] the unusually
high share of government bond collateral in tri-party repos.” In contrast, the
composition of central bank collateral has shown just the opposite develop-
ment. Indeed, media reports suggest that the share of illiquid and relatively
risky assets such asset-backed securities has increased signicantly since the
beginning of the turbulences in August 2007.8
To better understand these observations, the present paper takes a closer
look at the role of collateral in interbank lending relationships. A hypo-
thetical scenario is studied in which two counterparties, a borrower and a
lender, negotiate simultaneously about (a) the collateral assets to be used,
(b) the haircut, and (c) the repo rate. Extending the existing theoretical
framework, we allow for two-sided counterparty risk, i.e., the possibility that
the borrower and likewise the lender may default. This has potentially im-
portant consequences for the economic determinants of collateral. Moreover,
the analysis will enable us to study the welfare consequences of the central
bank’s collateral policy.
It turns out that with two-sided credit risk, the bilateral negotiation be-
tween borrower and lender achieves a subtle balance of interests. On the one
hand, the lender may be willing to accept a somewhat lower haircut in ex-
change for a somewhat higher repo rate, as a higher haircut obviously implies
better protection for the lender. Conversely, the borrower may be willing to
8Similar developments have been documented for the US. For instance, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (2008, p. 21) writes that “in recent years the distribution
by collateral tranche of outstanding RPs has been weighted heavily toward the Treasury
tranche...until nancial market strains appeared in short-term funding markets. At that
point dealers’ propositions against agency and MBS collateral tranches that it accepts on
its RPs became more attractive on a relative basis.”12
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provide somewhat more collateral for a somewhat lowered repo rate. This is
not costless, however, because there is the real risk that collateral deposited
by the borrower may get lost in the lender’s insolvency mass.9 Optimal risk
sharing is achieved, therefore, by making the marginal rate of substitution
between haircut and repo rate congruent between the two counterparties. It
turns out that, as a consequence, if collateral is not perfect, i.e., if price  uc-
tuation or illiquidity is possible, then it is typically optimal to expose both
parties to non-trivial counterparty risk.
The e!ciency of risk sharing is what ultimately drives our rst main
result. This result says that if two counterparties agree to transact, they
always agree to use the most liquid and the least risky assets of the borrower
as collateral rst. Thus, in a bilateral transaction between two counterparties
that may each default with positive probability, good collateral drives bad
collateral out of circulation, suggesting an intuitive analogy with Gresham’s
law for commodity money.
We go on and study the general feasibility of secured contracting under
market stress. It is shown that if the most liquid and least risky assets of the
borrower are still relatively illiquid or risky then the two counterparties may,
even under symmetric information and zero opportunity costs of collateral,
9The institutional literature has repeatedly stressed this issue. For instance, Stigum
(1989, p. 325) writes that “Sophisticated managers of large bond portfolios exercise ex-
treme care in determining to whom they will reverse out their valued bonds” (emphasis
in the original). Corrigan and de Terán (2007, p. 76) emphasize the same point: “It is
often mistakenly thought that the provider of cash has the greater credit risk but this is
not necessarily so.” An example illustrating the symmetric nature of counterparty risk in
collateralized transactions is the failure of the securities dealer Drysdale in 1982. Accord-
ing to Garbade (2006, p. 32), “it was quickly evident that rms that had lent securities
to Drysdale were inadequately margined and were going to be left with far less cash than
the replacement cost of their securities.”13
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not be able to agree on a transaction at all. This outcome occurs in particular
if default probabilities are perceived as non-negligible by market participants,
which relates our analysis to the developments in the money markets follow-
ing August 2007. The break-down of the market under two-sided credit risk
also adds to existing structural explanations of the microstructure of the
money market based on asymmetric information, and explains the existence
of central counterparties. Last but not least, this second result allows us to
relate our analysis to an important theoretical argument that has been put
forward recently by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002).
The nal part of the analysis explores the question how the central bank’s
collateral policy might aect overall welfare. It is shown that the expansion of
the set of collateral eligible for central bank operations may lead to a welfare
improvement for market participants. However, as we also show, the expan-
sion of the set of eligible collateral is typically accompanied by a replacement
of liquid collateral by illiquid collateral in the primary market. I.e., in con-
trast to the prediction obtained for market transactions, bad collateral drives
out good collateral in lending relationships with the central bank. More gen-
erally, the framework allows discussing the collateral framework of central
banks both in the context of scal discipline of euro area member countries
and in the context of the subprime crisis.
The analysis relates to further strands of the theoretical literature. One
is concerned with credit rationing and collateral under one-sided credit risk.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that credit rationing may occur as a
consequence of asymmetric information either at a pre- or post-contracting
stage. Bester (1985) has argued that in the case of pre-contracting asym-14
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metric information, the adverse selection problem may be resolved when
commitment to costly collateral is feasible for entrepreneurs with relatively
low risks. Berger and Udell (1990) remark that existing theoretical and em-
pirical approaches to the use of collateral still have to be reconciled, but see
Cocco (1999) for a potential resolution. Flannery (1995) has examined the
breakdown of the unsecured money market due to adverse selection in a crisis
situation.10
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I introduces the
model and discusses e!cient risk sharing in standard repurchase agreements
involving two-sided credit risk. Section II studies the possibility of a market
break-down. Section III elaborates on central bank policy and welfare con-
sequences. Section IV concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
I. The basic model
Consider a money market over three dates, date 0, date 1, and a terminal
date 2. There are altogether 1+p assets, cash and p  1 collateral assets
m =1 >===>p. Cash is riskless and does not carry interest. Collateral assets
may be either risky or illiquid or both.11 There are two counterparties in the
market.12 In the sequel, we will mainly think of these as commercial banks,
but the model applies with minor changes in the interpretation likewise to
10Still another strand of literature related to the present study is concerned with redis-
counting and payments. Freeman (1996) considers a model with overlapping generations
in which at money is used both for consumption and for repayment of loans. It is shown
that an elastic provision of liquidity within the period can resolve temporary tensions
in liquidity demand without aecting price levels for the consumption good. Mills (2006)
considers liquidity provision from a mechanism design perspective, and shows in particular
that distortions may occur when the central bank requires collateral that has alternative
benets for the borrowers.
11Kocherlakota (2001) uses risky collateral to rationalize deposit insurance.
12An extension to more than two counterparties is not attempted here.15
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other nancial and non-nancial institutions.
Bank l =1 >2 has an exogenous initial endowment of cash and collateral
assets at date 0. Each bank is required to hold a certain amount of cash
(potentially zero) at the end of date 1. Cash held in excess of these minimum
reserve requirements will be of no value, i.e., there is no carry-over provision.
Moreover, initial endowments in cash are such that reserve requirements
would be fullled without slack in the absence of further transactions. For
l =1 >2,l e tb a n kl’s utility function be denoted by xl(=).T h ef u n c t i o nxl(=) is
assumed to be weakly concave and dierentiable with x0
l(=) A 0. Each bank
l =1 >2 maximizes expected utility from terminal payos.
The time structure of the model is as follows (cf. also Figure 1). Between
dates 0 and 1, there is a publicly observable random customer request to
transfer an amount A0 of cash at date 1. With equal probability, the
transfer will be from Bank 1 to Bank 2 or vice versa from Bank 2 to Bank
1. The absolute size  of the liquidity shock may also be random. However,
without loss of generality,  will initially be normalized to one “unit.” To
compensate for the liquidity shock, the bank receiving the transfer, bank lO,
will seek to become the lender in the money market, while the bank sending
the funds, bank lE, will seek to become the borrower.
By denition, if not defaulted, a commercial bank in the role of the bor-
r o w e r( l e n d e r )i se q u i p p e da td a t e2w i t hs u !cient assets to repay principal
and interest (to redeliver the collateral). Without loss of generality, there
are then three states of nature: In state $ = J, neither the lender nor
the borrower defaults (this is the “good” state); in state $ = E,o n l yt h e
borrower defaults; and in state $ = O, only the lender defaults. Denote16
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by $ = $(lE>l O) the probability that state $ realizes at date 2, where
$ 5 {J>E>O}. Clearly, J+E +O =1 . The utility in case of own default
is normalized to zero.
The following assumption is fundamental to all what follows. To our
knowledge, it also marks the departure from the existing theoretical literature
on collateralized lending.
Assumption 1. (Two-sided credit risk) E A 0, O A 0.
To mitigate two-sided credit risks, banks might in principle want to write
complicated contracts that condition on all the information observable and
veriable at date 2. However, to make progress, we shall instead consider an
institutional form of the repo contract.13 Specically, it is assumed that coun-
terparties may sign a standard repurchase agreement (SRA) F =( |>k>u),
which is composed of a collateral composition |,ah a i r c u tk  1,a n da
repo rate u. Here and later on, a composition is a collection | =( |1>===>|p)
of weights |m  0 for individual assets m such that
Pp
m=1 |m =1 .T h ea g r e e -
ment foresees that the lender promises to transfer one unit of cash at date
1. The borrower in turn promises to deposit collateral of composition | with
t h el e n d e ra td a t e1 . 14 Moreover, the common haircut k is applied to all
assets.15 At date 2, in the good state, the borrower will repay the principal
13Lacker (2001) derives conditions for collateralized debt contracts being optimal.
14For cash-driven repos considered here, the lender typically leaves the borrower a cer-
tain discretion (typically upwards in quality) concerning the collateral. This discretion,
however, seems to be motivated by practical issues (such as coordination problems across
trading desks), which are absent from our model.
15Equivalently, but more demanding in terms of notation, the contract could specify an
individual haircut for each collateral asset used in the transaction, where the collateral
composition should be adjusted correspondingly.17
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plus an interest (rate) u. The lender, in turn, redelivers the collateral to the
borrower.
So far, the contract would be incomplete, as no provisions are made for
the cases of the borrower’s or the lender’s default. Specically, as the in-
terbank contract matures, the lender’s claim on repayment of principal and
interest would stand against the borrower’s non-monetary claim on the col-
lateral. Without documented provisions, the lender would have no legal basis
for liquidating the collateral asset in case of the borrower’s default. In the
worst case, the insolvency agent of the defaulting borrower would decide to
refuse payment, while claiming delivery of the collateral. Likewise, with-
out provisions, the borrower would have no right to withhold repayment of
principal and interest when the lender does not render the collateral.
The institutional reply to this problem is to allow for setting-o (or net-
ting) of mutual claims in case of insolvency of one counterparty.16 Netting
involves transforming the borrower’s claim for delivery of the collateral into
a monetary claim. Following standard legal practice, we will assume that the
size of the monetary claim is determined by market conditions at the time
when the default occurs. Let e ye denote the liquidation value of the collateral
portfolio at date 2, conditional on the borrower’s default. Similarly, let e yd
denote the replacement cost of the collateral portfolio at date 2, conditional
on the lender’s default.17
16The contract form provided by The Bond Market Association (2000) foresees a set-o
of mutual claims in case of one-sided insolvency, where collateral claims are evaluated by
the non-defaulting party either by actual, quotes, or estimated market prices. This con-
tract has been used prevalently in major repo markets (cf. Garbade, 2006, and Comotto,
2007).
17Alternatively, there is no market available at date 2, and prices re ect the respective
second-best alternative. For instance, when no buyer can be found for the collateral, then18
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Assumption 2. (Netting) In state $ = E, the borrower’s claim on the
collateral is replaced by a claim of payment of e ye.I n s t a t e $ = O,t h e
borrower’s claim is replaced by a claim of payment of e yd. Subsequently, the
claim of the non-defaulting party vis-à-vis the defaulting party may be used
to set o the claim of the defaulting party vis-à-vis the non-defaulting party.
For instance, in state $ = E, the lender’s claim on repayment of principal
plus interest is protected by the collateral only if the realized liquidation value
ye of the collateral portfolio at date 2 covers 1+u. Thus, the lender incurs
a potential loss of min{ye  (1 + u);0}  0 compared to state J. Similarly,
in state $ = O, the borrower has a potential loss of min{(1+u)yd;0}  0,
where yd is the realized replacement cost of the collateral portfolio at date
2. In reality, the extent to which such a potential loss becomes an actual
loss depends on several factors including whether the insolvency assets of
the defaulting party have some market value, and whether the net claim of
the non-defaulting party is senior to claims by third parties. The following
assumption is made for simplicity.
Assumption 3. (Subordination) Any net claim of the non-defaulting
party vis-à-vis the defaulting party will be completely lost.
As an additional matter, the agreement must be specic about what happens
when the defaulting party has a claim that exceeds the claim of the non-
defaulting party. A very primitive form of netting would imply that the
non-defaulting party ends up with a windfall prot. For instance, in the case
e ye should be replaced by the risk-adjusted present value of the cash  ow generated for
the lender by holding the collateral until maturity net of costs of funding, all projected
conditional on the borrower’s default.19
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of the borrower’s default, the lender could sell the collateral and keep any
potential interim increase in the market price. Similarly, in the case of the
lender’s default, the borrower would prot from a decline in the collateral
value. This primitive form of netting is not applied in the money market.18
Assumption 4. (No windfall prots) If the defaulting party has a net
claim vis-à-vis the non-defaulting party then the non-defaulting party has the
obligation to pay the net claim (to the insolvency agent of the defaulting
party).
Assumptions 2 through 4 complement the contract and thereby determine
conditional expected utilities for the two counterparties. Write xO(=)=xlO(=)
and xE(=)=xlE(=).L e te xO and e xE, respectively, denote the lender’s and the
borrower’s uncertain terminal utility at the time of contracting. Then the
lender’s expected utility at the time of contracting is given by
H[e xO]=JxO(u)+EH[xO(min{e ye  1;u})],( 1 )
where H[=] denotes the unconditional expectation operator. Similarly,
H[e xE]=JxE(u)+OH[xE(min{1  e yd;u})] (2)
will be the borrower’s expected utility at the time of contracting.19
18In practice, no-fault termination is excluded in standard repurchase agreements, i.e.,
no single counterparty can just walk away from the contract before maturity.
19In general, counterparties’ actual returns may dier from expressions given in (1) and
(2) as a consequence of accounting rules. More specically, Gri!ths and Winters (1997, p.
819) report that in the US, government and agency repos do not aect required reserves
for a depository institution, whereas private-issue repos are exempt from Federal Reserve
Board Regulation D. This might imply an indirect cost of using private-issue collateral
in the US repo market. This eect, however, is absent in the Euro area, because the
Eurosystem generally applies a zero reserve ratio to all repo liabilities (cf. ECB 2005, p.
57).20
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From the explicit expressions for the counterparties’ expected utilities, it
is immediate that the two-sided credit risk could be eectively eliminated
by using a type of collateral that shares the desirable properties of cash in
terms of risklessness and liquidity. However, such collateral is very unlikely to
exist in reality. To account for imperfections of collateral, we shall assume a
linear ordering of collateral assets along a joint liquidity/riskiness dimension.
This ordering is inspired by strict second-order stochastic dominance, but
is technically somewhat stronger than standard denitions. Let e s
m
e (and e sm
d)
denote the liquidation value (replacement cost) of asset m, conditional on the
borrower’s (lender’s) default.
Assumption 5. (Liquidity ranking) There are constants 1 A 0>===>p A








d ,a l lo fw h i c hp o s s e s s









ally independent, and such that
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e with H[e %
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e s
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d with H[e %
m
d] A 0( m =1 >===>p),
where e s0
e  e s0
d  1.
Here, the symbol  denotes equality in distribution. The constant m takes
account of the possibility that “relative market values” of collateral assets,
measured for instance by the midpoint of ask and bid prices, may change
between the time of contracting and date 2.20 The random variables e %
m
e and
20Our analysis does not presuppose marketability of collateral assets at the time of
contracting. However, there is one interpretation of the model in which all collateral
assets are perfectly liquid at the time of contracting and possess a market value of 1 at21
ECB




d capture both illiquidity and liquidity risk on the sell side (buy side) of the
asset market at date 2, conditional on the default of the lender (of the buyer).
Thus, a collateral asset with a higher index is assumed to be less liquid and
subject to more liquidity risk than any collateral asset with a lower index.
Clearly,













It is assumed in the sequel that the multivariate conditional distributions of
the vectors (e s1
e>===> e sp
e ) and (e s1
d>===> e sp
d ) are common knowledge among market
participants.
A scenario will be considered now in which lender and borrower bargain
to an e!cient outcome. Let tl
m  0 denote bank l’s initial endowment of
collateral asset m,f o rl =1 >2 and m =1 >===>p. Apparently, the bargaining
set for borrower and lender will consist of all standard repurchase agreements
(|>k>u) with collateral composition | =( |1>===>|p) that satisfy
|m(1 + k)  t
lE
m (m =1 >===>p).( 5 )
An SRA that satises (5) will be called valid. A valid SRA is e!cient when
the pair of counterparties’ expected utilities resulting from the contract is
not dominated, in the Pareto sense, by expected utilities resulting from any
other valid SRA.
that stage. Note also that if collateral assets are assumed to be marketable both at the
time of contracting and in the good state, outright trading becomes an alternative to the
repo, and expected round-trip costs may impose a bound on implicit opportunity rates
(cf. Section II).22
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Given our assumptions, it turns out that any e!cient SRA will expose
both the lender and the borrower to non-trivial credit risk.
Theorem 1 (Risk sharing). Under Assumptions 1 through 5, for any
e!cient SRA, pr(e ye ? 1+u) A 0 and pr(e yd A 1+u) A 0.
Indeed, under the assumptions made, it cannot be e!cient to protect one
counterparty fully. To see why, assume that the lender, say, is fully protected
against any losses. Then a marginal decrease of the haircut may lead to an
innitesimally small loss for the lender, but this loss occurs only with an
innitesimally small probability. As a consequence, the expected utility of a
fully protected lender is not lowered by a marginal concession in the haircut.
However, for the borrower, who is not fully protected, a marginal decrease
in the haircut reduces losses that occur with strictly positive probability.
Hence, when the lender is fully protected, the relative willingness to pay (in
terms of utility) for a concession in the repo rate compared to a concession
in the haircut is innite for the lender, but nite for the borrower. Thus,
full protection of the lender cannot be e!cient. A similar argument shows
that full protection of the borrower likewise cannot be Pareto optimal. Thus,
optimal risk sharing must be true risk sharing.21
From this general theoretical insight, the following testable characteriza-
tion of the market contract can be derived.
Theorem 2 (Gresham’s law for collateral, market version). Under
21Interior risk sharing may break down when the conditional liquidation value (replace-
ment cost) is bounded from below (above) by a mass point. For instance, when there is a
partial guarantee for the collateral by a third party, then it may be optimal to fully insure
the lender against the residual counterparty risk. A mass point at zero, however, does not
invalidate the conclusion of Theorem 1.23
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Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Thus, provided that rational counterparties reach an e!cient outcome, good
collateral is used up rst in the interbank lending relationship. Illiquid col-
lateral is not used in the market because it would not allow counterparties
to share their risks resulting from the agreement as e!ciently as liquid col-
lateral. Theorem 2 thereby oers an explanation for the empirical nding
mentioned in the Introduction that interbank repos are so much concentrated
on liquid collateral.
The intuition for Theorem 2 is as follows. Assume that borrower and
lender consider a collateral composition that contains some relatively illiquid
collateral even though the borrower would be able to oer somewhat more of
a relatively liquid collateral. I.e., it would be possible for the counterparties
to replace a fraction of the illiquid collateral by a portion of the more liquid
collateral. As we show in the Appendix, there is then a joint adjustment to
composition and haircut that strictly reduces the exposure of both counter-
parties to counterparty risk. This Pareto ranking can be achieved essentially
because counterparty’s indirect utility functions (1) and (2) are weakly con-
cave. Any improvement in the liquidity of the collateral portfolio thereby
weakly raises expected utilities for both lender and borrower at the time of24
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contracting. In fact, Theorem 1 implies that the kinks in the indirect utility
functions are hit by realizations of the uncertainty with positive probability,
so that in fact a strict gain in utility is achieved for both counterparties. This
argument shows, therefore, that it is optimal to fully use up the most liquid
collateral rst in the interbank lending relationship.22
If credit risk is one-sided only (and collateral is ample), the economic
characteristics of the collateral asset should play a subordinated role. For
instance, if the lender cannot default then the borrower could in many cases
oer even very illiquid assets as collateral. Indeed, provided that the liqui-
dation value of the collateral asset is bounded away from zero, a su!ciently
large haircut would fully protect the lender against any credit risk.23 Con-
versely, when the borrower cannot default, no collateral is needed in the rst
place.
II. Feasibility of the market transaction
In this section, it is shown that interbank lending may not be feasible even
if collateral causes no opportunity costs, information is symmetrically dis-
tributed, and physical transaction costs are zero. Su!cient conditions for
a market break-down are that both banks default with positive probability
and that assets that are available as collateral are not perfectly liquid or else
not absolutely risk-free.
But indeed, counterparties will approve a contract only when it is indi-
22Also security-driven repurchase agreements tend to concentrate on liquid assets. This
is because of dynamic shorting strategies that rely on the trader’s ability to close the
position potentially at very short notice. We are grateful to Darrell Du!ef o rp o i n t i n g
this out to us.
23Otherwise, the borrower of cash would of course oer all available collateral.25
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vidually rational to do so. We assume outside options guaranteeing utilities
of xO =( J + E)xO(uG) to the lender and xE =( J + O)xE(uO) to the
borrower, respectively, where uG = uG(lO) is the lender’s implicit risk-free
opportunity deposit rate, and uO = uO(lE) is the borrower’s implicit unse-
cured opportunity lending rate. In practice, eective outside options might
include capital market transactions (a bond issue, say), outright transactions
(provided that collateral assets are marketable at the time of contracting, cf.
footnote 20), money market transactions with non-banks, recourses to the
central bank’s standing facilities, renegotiation of contractual obligations, ac-
cepting a contractual penalty, etc. In the worst case, banks might become
even more reluctant to oer credit to non-banks.
For any given uG,d e n o t eb yG(k) t h el o w e s tr e p or a t et h a tal e n d e rw o u l d
be willing to accept for a given haircut k.C l e a r l y ,G(k)  uG. Similarly, for
any given opportunity rate uO,d e n o t eb yO(k)  uO the highest repo rate
that the borrower would accept for a given haircut k. Figure 2 illustrates
G(k) and O(k) for a numerical example. Note that the cut-o rate for Figure
2a b o u t
here both lender and borrower is declining in the haircut because a higher haircut
implies improved (weakened) protection for the lender (borrower) that must
be compensated by a lower (lower) repo rate.
Theorem 3. (Market break-down) Let Assumptions 1 through 5 be sat-
ised. Then, for any u0 A 0, there is an implicit unsecured lending rate uO
for the borrower and an implicit risk-free deposit rate uG for the lender such
that uO Au 0 Au G, and such that with these opportunity rates, no market
transaction is individually rational for both lender and borrower.26
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Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Theorem 3 oers an explanation for the observation that in times of nancial
distress and mutual distrust, nancial institutions may not be willing to
exchange liquidity against relatively illiquid collateral. In reality, such a
break-down may be driven by several, mutually reinforcing factors. First,
banks may perceive a higher probability of an individual default. Second,
perceptions of potential illiquidity and riskiness may increase, making it more
di!cult to achieve conditions that are individually rational for both sides
of the contract. Third, counterparties may also become more risk-averse.
Fourth, there may be the fear that liquidity needs still increase. Finally,
even if a counterparty would be willing to give cash for collateral today,
this counterparty may be less condent that the collateral will be accepted
tomorrow. The joint eect of such developments may lead to a disruption
even of the “secured” segment of the interbank market.
Theorem 3 captures the fact that even in the repo market, a counterparty
benets signicantly from contracting with a counterparty that has a good
credit rating. In reality, this benet should be re ected in the topology of
the interbank network. Two types of regularities are predicted. First, coun-
terparties with an excellent rating may be able to intermediate in the repo
market. In practice, this should lead to a two-tiered structure of the repo
market, just as predicted for the unsecured market by Freixas and Holthausen
(2004). The second regularity should be the emergence of central counter-
party trading. Indeed, while restricted to dominant players, central counter-
party trading has recently gained momentum in the euro area.24
24Theorem 3 also provides a rationale for the use of maintenance margins in markets27
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The comparative statics for feasibility is as suggested by intuition. The
lower the default probabilities of lender and borrower, respectively, the more
liquid and less risky the collateral, and the less attractive the outside options,
the more likely is the market transaction. Vice versa, the worse the rating
of lender and borrower, the less liquid and more risky the collateral, and the
more acceptable the outside options, the more likely is a break-down of the
market relationship.25
Example 1. As an illustration, assume that both lender and borrower are
risk-neutral. Assume also that the liquidation value and the replacement cost
of the only available collateral asset is known to be se and sd with certainty at
date 1, respectively, where sd As e A 0.C o n s i d e rrst the lender. Expected
utility at the time of contracting is given by
H[e xO]=Ju + E min{(1 + k)se  1;u}.
It is not di!cult to see that in any contractible (i.e., e!cient) agreement
(|>k>u), the lender will not be overprotected, i.e.,
(1 + k)se  1+u.( 6 )
This is because overprotection would be without value for the lender, but
costly for the borrower. Thus,
H[e xO]=Ju + E((1 + k)se  1).
for repurchase agreements. Maintenance margins are an instrument that keeps collateral
deposits for a cash-driven repo abreast with the development of the market price of the
collateral. As our analysis suggests, this is a useful instrument to balance the interests
of both counterparties also in transactions that have a longer maturity, i.e., term repos.
Thus, intuitively, maintenance makes feasibility easier to achieve.
25Maybe interestingly, the analysis suggests that a borrower may nd it easier to transact
in the interbank market by oering the lender a collateral whose market value is positively
correlated with the lender’s survival, such as the lender’s own uncovered bonds.28
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Comparing these expressions with the available outside option xO for the







G  (1 + k)se),
the lender would be willing to contract against a haircut of k. On the other
hand, when (6) is not satised, then the lender would be overprotected, and







G  (1 + k)se)
+,( 7 )
where, as usual, ({)+ = { for {A0 and =0otherwise. Using completely
analogous arguments, one can see that the borrower would be willing to







O  (1 + k)sd)
3,( 8 )
where ({)3 = { for {?0 and =0otherwise.
Apparently, a repurchase agreement (u>k) is contractible between bor-
rower and lender if and only if G(k)  O(k) for some k. As the expressions
(7) and (8) are piecewise linear, one can check that a contract is not feasible



































as intuitive conditions for contractibility. That is, in the case of risk-neutrality
and risk-free but illiquid collateral, contracting is impossible if and only if
both (9) and (10) are satised.26
Illiquidity of collateral assets might have played a role in recent market de-
velopments. On August 9, 2007, problems with subprime loans in the US led,
among other things, to a sudden dry-out of the market for asset-backed com-
mercial paper, which has served as a source of funding for so-called structured
investment vehicles. Banks with credit commitments vis-à-vis such vehicles
had an unexpected increase in liquidity needs. Long-term assets held by
the vehicles, such as collateralized debt obligations, could no longer serve
as collateral. At the same time, those investors that had refused to roll
over commercial paper have received signicant cash transfers to their bank
accounts.
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) have put forward the argument that
commercial banks have the unique ability to pool imperfectly correlated liq-
uidity risks resulting from loan commitments and deposit contracts. Gatev
and Strahan (2006) nd empirical support for a similar mechanism in the
context of the commercial paper market. The stylized facts mentioned above
might relate our analysis to the pooling argument. Specically, one could
argue that before the turbulences, numerous banks might have decided to
26A closer inspection of Example 1 also shows that with a degenerate price distribution
and with risk-neutrality, it can be e!cient to protect one party fully against any credit
risk.30
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specialize and to exploit the synergies identied by Kashyap et al. across the
money market, assuming that liquidity risks can be shared eectively with
other banks. Then, during the turbulence, some of those banks (e.g., invest-
ment banks) would have to satisfy a loan commitment, while others would
receive a liquidity in ow in the form of additional deposits. However, in view
of Theorem 3, a market transaction that matches supply and demand may
not be guaranteed. Thus, using the terminology introduced by Kashyap et
al., with specialized banks, synergies across banks may become a prerequisite
to synergies across the two sides of the balance sheet.
III. Welfare implications
In the previous sections, it has been shown that with two-sided credit risk,
counterparties seek to use the most liquid and least risky assets as collateral
rst. A policy issue may arise here when central bank operations have the
potential to withhold liquid collateral assets from uses in the interbank mar-
ket. To address this issue, an extension of the basic model will be considered
in which banks forward collateral also to the central bank. Examined will be
the consequences on welfare of changing the central bank’s collateral policy.27
Thus, in contrast to the set-up considered so far, it is assumed now that
from date 0 onwards, Bank 1 and Bank 2 have debt of G1  0 and G2  0,
respectively, outstanding vis-à-vis the central bank (cf. Figure 1). We also Figure
1a b o u t
here assume throughout this section that the size of the liquidity shock  is the
realization of a random variable e  with full support on RA0.
It is assumed that the central bank exerts its in uence on the money
27The question of why apparently all central banks do require collateral is not addressed
in this paper. For a comprehensive discussion of this point, see ECB (2007b).31
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market by two policy choices. At date 0, the central bank decides about
its collateral policy.S p e c i cally, it is assumed that the central bank chooses
as e tM = {1>===>pCB} of eligible assets, where 1  pCB  p. Only assets
c o n t a i n e di nt h es e tM will be accepted as collateral in central bank operations.
Let m  0 denote the exogenous haircut applied by the central bank to asset
m 5 M. In contrast to the interbank market, these haircuts are not subject to
negotiation.
Second, the central bank exerts in uence on the money market by aect-
ing the relative bargaining power of lender and borrower in the market. For
specicity, it is assumed that the central bank chooses, immediately following
the liquidity shock, a liquidity policy  =( O> E) such that O  0, E  0,
and O + E =1 ; counterparties then determine the terms of the SRA at
the contracting stage using the Nash bargaining solution, where O becomes




l(M) the composition of bank l’s collateral deposits, net
of haircuts, with the central bank at date 0. Note that by the denition
of the collateral policy, 
l
m =0for m@ 5 M. In line with the institutional
environment in the euro area, it is assumed that each bank l may at any
point in time change the collateral composition with the central bank as long
as the total market value of the collateral net of haircuts remains at least
Gl. Such replacement may indeed occur, in particular when the bank lE that
turns out to be the borrower wishes to replace liquid by illiquid collateral at
the time of contracting to free liquid collateral for an interbank transaction.
Substitution is not necessary, though. In our framework, there are in32
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principle two reasons why relatively liquid collateral may be kept with the
central bank. One potential reason is that the maximal size of the liquidity
shock expected in the interbank market is small, so that there is no need
to optimize collateral usage vis-à-vis the central bank. The reader will note
that we have chosen to exclude this possibility by imposing a full-support
assumption on e , but it is clear that dropping this assumption would yield
partial indeterminacy of central bank collateral. The second potential reason
for not optimizing the portfolio of collateral held vis-à-vis the central bank
is that the secured market is rationally expected to break down. To exclude
this possibility, we impose another assumption. For simplicity, we will as-
sume that a market break-down may occur only when the liquidity shock is
excessively large, i.e., only when the shock exceeds the maximum quantity
of liquidity that the central bank is willing to lend to the counterparties.
Assumption 6. (No crowding-out) For l =1 >2, there is no market





The following denition turns out to be useful. For a given central bank
policy (M>), a pair of collateral compositions (
1>
2) for Banks 1 and 2,
respectively, will be called stable if there is, for any realization of lE =1 >2,
and for any realized liquidity shock A0, either a break-down or a Pareto
e!cient SRA between Banks 1 and 2 that does not imply the replacement of
collateral deposited with the central bank. We are ready to formally capture
the residual characteristic of central bank collateral.
Theorem 4. (Gresham’s law for collateral, central bank version) Let
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Then for l =1 >2, the collateral composition is given by


















> 0>===>0 | {z }
p3pCB times
),
where mW(l) denotes the largest index such that
PpCB
m=mW(l) tl
m@(1 + m)  Gl.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Theorem 4 captures the observations discussed in the Introduction by sug-
gesting that commercial banks have an incentive to use less liquid and more
risky assets with preference in central bank operations. Indeed, as more liquid
and less risky assets allow a better risk sharing in interbank repo transac-
tions, there is an endogenous opportunity cost of using the more liquid and
less risky assets vis-à-vis the central bank. Moreover, the residual nature of
central bank collateral should become more evident in times of increasing
liquidity risks.
Our analysis should also help to clarify the role of haircuts applied by the
central bank. Haircuts have always been an instrument of risk management,
both for commercial banks and for central banks. However, as Theorem
4 shows, there is only a very limited role for haircuts as an instrument to
steer the composition of central bank collateral. Indeed, the opportunity
costs of using the least liquid and most risky assets accepted by the central
bank will remain negligible as long as the borrower’s holdings of such assets
are ample enough. Changing haircuts should therefore not be su!cient to
induce commercial banks to use more liquid and less risky collateral vis-à-vis34
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the central bank. In particular, haircuts are not an instrument for ne-tuning
the composition of collateral along, say, issuing scal authorities. This point
addresses a question of a signicant practical interest (cf. Fels, 2005, for
instance).28
To evaluate the welfare consequences of the collateral framework, it is
useful to note that the central bank is always in the position to eectively
limit its exposure from repo operations vis-à-vis counterparties that have
ample collateral. Indeed, given its standing as a monetary authority, our
earlier remark at the end of Section I should apply also here, i.e., there is
no market disruption even when haircuts required to limit the central bank’s
exposure are relatively large. Motivated by this consideration, we will analyze
welfare without explicit reference to the central bank and exclusively in terms
of expected utilities for lender and borrower.
Two hypothetical scenarios are compared now where the central bank
may either pursue a tight or a generous stance concerning the acceptance of
collateral. Moreover, adding realism, we will allow that the borrower’s oppor-
tunity rate uO = uO(lE>M) m a yd e p e n da l s oo nt h ec e n t r a lb a n k ’ sc o l l a t e r a l
framework.
Theorem 5. (Welfare consequences) Let Assumptions 1 through 5 be
satised. Fix some policy (M>), a collateral set M0  M,a n ds o m elE.
Assume that uO(lE>M0)  uO(lE>M). Then for H[e xE|(M>)]  xE(M0),t h e r e
is a liquidity policy 0 such that both H[e xE] and H[e xO] increase weakly.
28Alternatively, one might want to apply dierent pricing to dierent collateral, e.g.,
by using variable-rate tenders for given quantities in each liquidity basket. However, this
strategy may not be practicable under all circumstances (cf. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 2008).35
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Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Theorem 5 contains a prediction concerning the welfare implications of an
expanded collateral set. It says that if an extension of the set of collateral as-
sets accepted by the central bank is accompanied by an appropriate liquidity
policy 0, this may increase expected utilities for both lender and borrower.
The reason is that a less restrictive collateral policy allows counterparties to
use more liquid and less risky collateral in the interbank repo market. Maybe
it should be stressed at this point that the weak increase of expected utility
for both lender and borrower implies that the certainty-equivalent interest
rates for the two counterparties move closer together. In fact, by denition,
any liquidity policy 0 that, compared to the tight collateral regime M com-
bined with liquidity pocliy , increases the implicit risk-free deposit rate for
the lender and decreases the implicit unsecured lending rate for the borrower
will produce the welfare gain. The policy change suggested by Theorem 4
is therefore consistent with the view that the central bank is mainly in the
market to steer interbank conditions, and that welfare maximization through
the collateral framework is subject to this important constraint.
Note that the welfare gain is not certain. Specically, there might be a
loss of expected utility for the lender if the expansion of the collateral set
improves the outside option for the borrower. This scenario is more likely
when the borrower is close to the outside option with the more restrictive
policy. On the other hand, the loss of interim utility for the lender may
sometimes be more than compensated from an ex ante perspective when the
roles of lender and borrower are not yet assigned.29
29Collateral policy might aect market activity in other ways than suggested by Theo-36
ECB
Working Paper Series No 909
June 2008
To illustrate Theorem 5, we brie y consider the cases of the US Fed, the
Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the Bank of Australia. Before the
start of the turmoil in August 2007, these central banks generally accepted
only a very narrow range of assets, mainly government bonds, as collateral.
During the turbulences, however, all of these institutions signicantly broad-
ened the range of eligible collateral. Theorem 5 provides a rationale for such
policy adjustment.30
On the other hand, in view of Theorems 2 and 3, it may well be that
the collateral potentially unleashed by an enlargement of the set of eligible
collateral will not be used in the market. It could be argued that this is
the present situation in the euro area given that the Eurosystem already
accepts a very broad list of assets as collateral. Then, it would not be the
case that too much precious collateral is bound in transactions with the
central bank. Widening the set of eligible collateral would, therefore, be
unlikely to re-establish the proper working of the money market. Indeed, the
current problems in the repo market seem to be linked rather to a general
concern about the quality of collateral assets and a mutual mistrust between
rems 3 and 4. Firstly, the usual moral hazard caveat applies. After all, accepting illiquid
collateral, especially during times of market stress, works like an insurance of commercial
banks against temporary funding problems. Secondly, to the extent that repricing risk of
illiquid assets may trigger margin calls, liquidity risks of commercial banks might actually
increase. Finally, there may be an impact on relative asset prices.
30For the case H[e xE|(M>)] ?x E(M0) that is not considered in Theorem 5, we informally
note that the lender may in principle be worse o following an extension of the range
of accepted collateral. There are two potential reasons for why this might be case. One
reason is that the lender might have had a very strong bargaining position in the tight
environment, which is lost when the central bank changes its policy. Another potential
reason is that there may be a crowding-out of the market transaction. Also this may mean
a loss for the lender, but again only when his bargaining position under the tight policy
had been strong.37
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Modern liquidity management increasingly relies on repurchase agreements
through which cash is exchanged short-term against collateral assets of longer
maturities. Interestingly, almost all such renancing is based on securities
that are very stable in value and actively traded. Market requirements on
asset liquidity became even stricter when interbank market conditions tight-
ened, as during the credit crunch following August 2007. On the other hand,
there has been a tendency to deposit more and more illiquid assets for use
in central banks’ liquidity-providing operations.
The present study has derived a number of theoretical predictions that
clarify and explain these and related observations. First, it has been shown
that if there is a choice of collateral in a market transaction, then the most
liquid and least risky asset will allow borrower and lender to achieve the most
e!cient risk-sharing. However, if the best collateral available is still relatively
illiquid or risky, and if there is non-negligible bilateral counterparty risk, then
no market transaction may come about at all. This point has allowed us to
apply a theoretical argument put forward recently by Kashyap, Rajan, and
Stein (2002). As regards to policy implications, it has been shown that a less
restrictive collateral policy applied by a central bank may lead to a welfare
improvement for market participants. Yet, the analysis also suggests that
31T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h eprecautionary demand for collateral that can be used with the
Eurosystem is high, as suggested by media reports (cf. Financial Times, 2008), a relaxation
of the criteria for collateral would of course help to improve commercial banks’ outside
option in case of market breakdown. However, the comparative statics of feasibility (cf.
Section II) suggests that this would make a market breakdown even more likely.38
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essentially unaected by the haircut requirement, the least liquid and most
risky assets will be deposited with the central bank.
The analysis provides a rationale for the decisions of several central banks
to broaden the range of assets accepted as collateral during the turmoil that
started in August 2007. For the euro area, the analysis comes to the conclu-
sion that a widening of the set of eligible collateral would not necessarily be
or have been supportive for a resolution of market disruptions. As there is
no evidence that too much high quality collateral is bound in central bank
operations, the benet of unleashing collateral of intermediate liquidity into
the market might turn out to be very limited. Instead, problems with se-
cured lending seem to be related to a general concern about the quality of
collateral assets and to a mutual mistrust in particular between banks.
The situation might have been dierent in the US. Since the start of
the market turbulences, the Federal Reserve System has repeatedly taken
measures that aimed at making a broader collateral base available. Moreover,
in a quite unconventional move, the Federal Reserve decided, eective on
Tuesday, March 11, 2008, to oer primary dealers an amount of $200 bn in
Treasury bonds and bills in exchange for mortgage-backed securities after
spreads for the latter instruments widened dramatically.32 As our analysis
shows, such measures will be directly benecial for the banking sector to
the extent that illiquidity of collateral assets impairs the functioning of the
money market.
32Cf. Wall Street Journal (2008). More recently, the Bank of England has implemented
similar measures, yet on a smaller scale.39
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Appendix: Proofs




e denote the conditional liquidation
value of the collateral portfolio net of haircuts, and let Ie(=) be the corre-
sponding distribution function. Then, re-writing (1) using integral notation,
the lender’s expected utility at the time of contracting reads
H[e xO]=JxO(u)+E
Z
xO(min{(1 + k)se  1;u})gIe(se),( 1 1 )
where se denotes the realized value of e se.T h ei n t e g r a n di n( 1 1 )w i l lb exO(u)
for all se As W =( 1+u)@(1 + k),a n dxO((1 + k)se  1) otherwise, where
sW = 4 for k = 1. Consequently, (11) can be re-written as





xO((1 + k)se  1)gIe(se).























































O((1 + k)se  1)gIe(se)40
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Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution between haircut and repo rate












O((1 + k)se  1)gIe(se)
.
A completely analogous derivation for the borrower yields the marginal rate












E(1  (1 + k)sd)gId(sd)
(13)
for the borrower, where Id(=) denotes the distribution function of e sd =
Pp
m=1 |me sm
d,a n dsd the realized value of e sd at date 2. To provoke a con-
tradiction, assume that Id(sW)=1 . Then clearly, from Assumption 1,
J + OId(sW) A 0. Moreover, as the distribution of e sd does not possess
any mass points by Assumption 5, the denominator in (13) vanishes. Thus,
MRSE
k>u = 4. On the other hand, by Lemma A.1, Ie(sW) A 0 and therefore
MRSO
k>u ? 4. Hence, in any e!cient agreement, Id(sW) ? 1,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,
pr{e yd A 1+u} = pr{(1 + k)e sd A 1+u} A 0=
Analogously, if Ie(sW)=0 ,t h e nM R S E
k>u ? 4,w h i l eM R S O
k>u = 4. Hence,
Id(sW) ? 1, which is tantamount to pr{e ye ? 1+u} A 0.T h u s ,ab o u n d a r y
solution in which one party is fully protected can never be e!cient. ¤
Lemma A.1. Under Assumption 5, there is no collateral composition | =




e  sW} =pr{
Pp
m=1 |me sm
d  sW} =1for some
cut-o value sW.41
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Proof. Immediate. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .Consider a valid SRA F =( |>k>u) with collateral
composition | =( |1>===>|p).T h e n
0  (1 + k)|m  t
lE




|m =1 .( 1 5 )
It su!ces to show that it is Pareto dominated for lender and borrower to
simultaneously use one collateral asset and not fully use up another collateral
with a lower index. To provoke a contradiction, assume that
|n+1 A 0 and (1 + k)|n ?t
lE
n (16)
for some n 5 {0>===>p  1}. By Assumption 5, there are constants 1 A








d ,s u c ht h a t
for m =1 >===>p,
e s
m












and such that H[e %
m
e] A 0, H[e %
m
d] A 0 and e s0
e  e s0
d  1. We will construct a














0)=|m(1 + k)( m 6= n>n +1 ) .42
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This can be achieved as follows. Let A0 be small. Dene the new SRA




1  (n+1  1)
 1,( 1 9 )
|
0
n =( 1  (n+1  1))|n + n+1,( 2 0 )
|
0
n+1 =( 1  (n+1  1))|n+1  ,( 2 1 )
|
0
m =( 1  (n+1  1))|m (m 6= n>n +1 ) ,( 2 2 )
and u0 = u. Clearly, for  small enough, the haircut k0 is well-dened. More-
over, using (14), (16), and
1+k =( 1 (n+1  1))(1 + k
0),
it is straightforward to check that for  small enough, we have





m (m =1 >===>p).





m =1 . Hence, for  small enough, the contract F0() is
well-dened and valid. It is claimed now that F0() achieves a strict Pareto
improvement over F. I tt u r n so u tt h a ti nf a c t ,f o rA0 small enough,
the utility level expected at the contracting stage increases strictly for both













of the collateral portfolio deposited under the new agreement. Using (20)
through (22), one obtains
e y
0








e  (1 + k
0)e s
n+1
e .( 2 3 )43
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Using (3), and subsequently (17) for m = n +1delivers
e y
0




Note that e ye and e %
n+1
e are not independent in general, and we have too little
information about the conditional expectation H[e %
n+1
e |e ye] to use second-order
stochastic dominance at this stage. We shall therefore re-write e y0
e as the sum
of two independent random variables. For this, note that a straightforward
induction argument involving Assumption 5 shows that















e m>m|m (m =0 >===>p)
dened recursively from |0 =0and
m>m =1 ( 0  m  p),




e = e }  
0e %
n+1
e ,( 2 4 )
where e } is independent from e %
n+1
e ,a n d

0 = n+1  (1 + k
0)
= n+1  (1 + k)

1  (n+1  1)
.
Hence, to prove that the lender is strictly better o with the new agreement
F0() for a su!ciently small A0,i ts u !ces to show that CH[e xO]@C
0 ? 0,44
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w h e r et h ed e r i v a t i v ei se v a l u a t e da t
0 = n+1.L e tJ(=) and K(=) denote the
distribution functions of random variables e } and e %
n+1
e , respectively. Then,









e )gJ(}),( 2 5 )
where } and %
n+1
e denote the realizations of random variables e } and e %
n+1
e ,
respectively. We wish to show that CH[e xO]@C
0 ? 0. The weak inequality
would follow from more standard arguments (cf., for instance, Tesfatsion,
1976), but the strict inequality apparently has to be shown directly. The
interior integral in (25) reads






















and can be dierentiated with respect to 
0 at 
0 = n+1.W eo b t a i n
C
C
























e ),( 2 6 )
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that x0
O(=) is weakly declining.














0H[e xO|$ = E, e } = }]  0.( 2 8 )45
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It su!c e st os h o wt h a t( 2 8 )i ss t r i c tf o r“ s u !ciently many” }. Recall that
by Theorem 1, e!ciency implies
pr{e y
0
e ? 1+u} ? 1.
Thus, by (24) and independence,
pr{e y
0
e ? 1+u} =
Z
K(
u  } +1

0 )gJ(}) ? 1.
Therefore, there must be a compact interval ] satisfying
R
] gJ(}) A 0 such
that for any } 5 ],w eh a v eK(u3}+1
0 ) ? 1.F i x } 5 ].F r o m ( 2 7 ) a n d
K(u3}+1








e )=( 1  K(







u  } +1

0 ]
 (1  K(




e ] A 0,
so that by (26), we nd indeed that
C
C
0H[e xO|$ = E, e } = }] ? 0.
Hence, CH[e xO]@C
0 ? 0. Thus, for small enough A0, the lender’s expected
utility at the time of contracting is strictly increasing in .A c o m p l e t e l y
analogous argument can be used to show that also the borrower’s expected
utility at the time of contracting is strictly increasing with a change from F
to F0(). Hence, the assertion of the theorem follows. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3. In view of Theorem 2, we may assume without loss
of generality that the borrower is equipped amply and exclusively with the
most liquid and least risky collateral 1. Dene uO>u G>k 0 as in Lemma A.346
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below. Then uO Au 0 Au G. Moreover, for any haircut k  1,e i t h e rk?k 0
or k  k0.I fk?k 0,t h e nG(k)  G(k0) Au O  O(k), so there is no repo
rate for which the market transaction is individually rational for lender and
borrower at the same time. If k  k0,t h e nO(k)  O(k0) ?u G  G(k),
and again no market transaction is feasible. This proves the assertion. ¤
Lemma A.2. Let Assumption 5 be satised. Then for any collateral com-





sW} A 0 and pr{
Pp
m=1 |me sm
d As W} A 0.
Proof. Immediate. ¤
Lemma A.3. There is a haircut k0  1 and interest rates uO>u G satisfying
uO Au 0 Au G such that G(k0) Au O and O(k0) ?u G.
Proof. B yL e m m aA . 2 ,t h e r ei sac u t - o  price sW for collateral 1 such that
Ie(sW) A 0 and Id(sW) ? 1.D e ne the haircut k0 by sW =( 1+u0)@(1 + k0).
Let uG = u0  % and uO = u0 + % for %A0 small. It will be shown that for %
small enough, G(k0) Au O and O(k0) ?u G. By the denition of G(k0),
(J + E)xO(u








xO((1 + k0)se  1)gIe(se),
where sW












G)  xO((1 + k0)se  1))gIe(se),
where the integral is either positive or zero. To provoke a contradiction,
assume that G(k0)  uO for all small %A0.T h e nsW
e  b se =( 1 + uO)@(1+k0),47
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G)  xO((1 + k0)se  1))gIe(se).
For se ? b sd =( 1+uG)@(1+k0), the expression integrated in (30) is positive,











G)  xO((1 + k0)se  1))gIe(se)

E













G)  xO((1 + k0)se  1))gIe(se)

E
J + Ie(b se)E
Z
e sd$se$e se









G)  xO((1 + k0)se  1))gIe(se)

E
















G)  xO((1 + k0)se  1))gIe(se).
Conditional prices for collateral have densities, so Ie(=) and Id(=) are contin-
uous. Hence, for any values b se> b sd close to sW it is still true that Id(b se) ? 1
and Ie(b sd) A 0. In particular, the integral in (31) is strictly positive. Using
Assumption 1, we nd a contradiction to the assumption that G(k0)  uO48
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for all small %A0.T h u s , G(k0) Au O for some su!ciently small %.B u t
for decreasing %, the interest rate uO is decreasing, while uG is increasing so
that G(k0) is non-decreasing. Hence, G(k0) Au O for any su!ciently small
%.A na n a l o g o u sa r g u m e n tc a nb eu s e dt os h o wt h a ta l s oO(k0) ?u G for all
su!ciently small %. Hence the assertion. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 .Assume that  is stable. To provoke a contradiction,
assume that collateral n is used vis-à-vis the central bank, but collateral
n +1  pFE is not at all or not exclusively used for the central bank.
Formally, 
lE








.( 3 2 )





m  (1 + m)GlE
lE





m  (1 + m)GlE
lE
m ).




m . Hence, by As-
sumption 6, there is no market break-down. Following now the lines of the
proof of Theorem 2, it can be seen that both counterparties can strictly gain
for this given  if the borrower replaces a small quantity of collateral n de-
posited with the central bank by a corresponding quantity of collateral n+1.
Hence  cannot be stable. The contradiction proves the assertion. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5. Fix M0  M. Assume r s tt h a tt h e r ei sam a r k e t
breakdown under policy (M>). Then lender and borrower obtain their out-
side option utilities xO =( J+E)xO(uG) and xE(M)=( J+E)xO(uO(M)),
respectively. Choose 0 = . If there is also a market-breakdown under49
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policy (M0> 0),t h e nxE(M0)  xE(M) increases weakly, while xO remains un-
changed. Hence there is a weak Pareto improvement in this case. If a market
transaction comes about under policy (M0> 0), then by individual rationality
H[e xO]  xO,a n dH[e xE]  xE(M0)  xE(M). Again, therefore, there is a weak
Pareto improvement. Assume now that a market transaction comes about
under policy (M>). The weak enlargement of the set of eligible collateral
implies a weak enlargement of the bargaining set, and a weak increase in the
borrower’s outside option utility. Consider rst the case H[e xE]  xE(M0).
Noting that the bargaining set is convex (possibly as a result of Pareto opti-
mal randomization over SRAs), there is a liquidity policy 0 such that a weak
Pareto improvement is obtained by changing from policy (M>) to (M0> 0).
If, however, H[e xE] ?x E(M0), the lender will always be worse o because
there is no break-down under (M>). If the change to collateral framework
M0 implies an empty intersection of individual rationality constraints and the
bargaining set, a crowding-out will result. This proves the assertion. ¤50
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